Obligations for Privacy and Confidentiality in Distributed Transactions by Mbanaso, Uche et al.
M. Denko et al. (Eds.): EUC Workshops 2007, LNCS 4809, pp. 69–81, 2007. 
© IFIP International Federation for Information Processing 2007 
Obligations for Privacy and Confidentiality in 
Distributed Transactions 
U.M. Mbanaso1, G.S. Cooper1, David Chadwick2, and Anne Anderson3 
1
 Informatics Research Institute (IRIS), University of Salford, UK 
2
 Computing Laboratory, University of Kent, UK 
3
 Sun Microsystems Inc, Burlington MA USA 
Abstract. Existing access control systems are typically unilateral in that the 
enterprise service provider assigns the access rights and makes the access 
control decisions, and there is no negotiation between the client and the service 
provider. As access management systems lean towards being user-centric, 
unilateral approaches can no longer adequately preserve the user’s privacy, 
particularly where the communicating parties have no pre-existing trust 
relationships. Establishing sufficient trust is therefore essential before parties 
can exchange sensitive information. This paper describes a bilateral symmetric 
approach to access control which deals with privacy and confidentiality 
simultaneously in distributed transactions. We introduce the concept of 
Obligation of Trust (OoT) as a privacy assurance mechanism that is built upon 
the XACML standard. The OoT allows communicating parties to dynamically 
exchange their privacy requirements, which we term Notification of Obligations 
(NOB) as well as their committed obligations, which we term Signed 
Acceptance of Obligations (SAO). We describe some applicability of these 
concepts and show how they can be integrated into distributed access control 
systems for stricter privacy and confidentiality control. 
1   Introduction 
Trends in emerging access management systems raise an interesting paradox. On the 
one hand, service providers’ applications require identity/attribute related information 
in order to validate a user’s request. On the other hand, users may not wish to disclose 
their information or attributes to a remote Service Provider (SP) without determining 
in advance whether the service provider can be trusted to comply with their privacy 
preferences. Conventionally, privacy is often considered from the users’ perspective, 
just as access control is considered from the SP’s standpoint. That is, the user is 
concerned about the confidentiality of their personal identifying information (PII), 
and the resource provider is concerned about the confidentiality and integrity of the 
resource information. These assumptions have resulted in unilateral asymmetric 
approaches. Yet the SP may also have sensitive attributes such as membership 
certificates of consortia, or trust relationships with third parties (TTPs) or policies of 
various kinds that a resource user may demand to see before releasing their PII. This 
suggests a symmetrical approach may be more appropriate, and has led to the research 
70 U.M. Mbanaso et al. 
topic called trust negotiation where each party’s attributes are released incrementally 
to the other, as trust is established between them [1]. In B2B transactions, both parties 
may require the dynamic exchange of service level agreements (SLA) or business 
level agreement (BLA) in order to assess the mutual benefits and associated risks. 
This may also require the establishment of trust and a guarantee of compliance to 
agreed business rules. One way to achieve this is for each party to issue to the other a 
proof of acceptance of the requirements contained in the SLA or BLA. Enabling the 
runtime exchange of these requires a bilateral symmetric approach to allow the 
communicating parties to indicate their willingness to accept constraints imposed by 
the other party, before the latter is prepared to reveal their sensitive information. 
There is therefore some overlap between user privacy requirements and business 
requirements.  
To address confidentiality and privacy problems simultaneously and symme-
trically, the parties in distributed transactions should have a standard means of 
declaring their privacy requirements and the respect they will give to the other party’s 
privacy requirements before sharing their resources. All parties need to evaluate the 
risk of giving out their PII and determine the degree to which they are prepared to 
trust the other participating actors. They will need to identify any constraints and 
obligations they may wish to place on the others. Trust negotiation [1] has been 
proposed to address this dilemma, but as will be pointed out later it has its limitations. 
We therefore approach the subject of resources control in a slightly different manner.  
We propose a technical solution that derives its concepts from well established 
standards. We describe the concept of an Obligation of Trust (OoT) protocol, 
whereby two parties can exchange difficult-to-repudiate1 digitally signed obligating 
constraints (or Notification of Obligations (NOB) which detail their requirements for 
sending their sensitive information to the other party), and proof of acceptances (or 
Signed Acceptance of Obligations (SAO), which acknowledge the conditions they 
have accepted for receiving the other party’s sensitive information). The OoT 
protocol provides the negotiating mechanism for carrying obligating constraints and 
proof of acceptances between security domains.  Being signed, they help the 
communicating parties to produce difficult-to-repudiate technical evidence in the 
event of disputes. The OoT protocol also provides a mechanism for dynamically 
exchanging other obligating documents such as service level agreements (SLAs), 
business level agreements (BLAs), contractual documents, etc. In effect, the OoT 
protocol merges technical solutions (mechanical exchange and matching, digital 
signature) with potential social/judicial solutions (non-repudiation, technical legal 
recourse).  The rest of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 describes related 
research. Section 3 presents the OoT protocol as well as how matching of obligation 
constraints and proof of acceptances is achieved. Section 4 describes the system 
architecture of a reference engine and its core subsystems, which we are currently 
constructing. In section 5, we provide an example use of the model and section 6 
concludes the paper. 
                                                          
1
 We use the term “difficult-to-repudiate” rather than non-repudiation, since repudiation is a 
legal issue that has to be determined in a court of law. The technical constructs proposed in 
this paper should make it more difficult for an entity to repudiate their actions. 
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2   Related Research 
The Platform for Privacy Preferences (P3P) [2] is one approach that attempts to 
address privacy in commercial service provider (SP) websites. Whilst it has provided 
some degree of privacy awareness, it has not particularly addressed privacy concerns 
in distributed access control systems.  The fact that P3P is widely implemented by 
most websites and processed by compliant user-agents by comparing the P3P policy 
statement against an APPEL [3] statement that describes the user’s privacy 
preferences is beneficial.  By contrast, in distributed access control systems, SPs don’t 
usually convey their privacy policy statements to the service users during access 
request. Even if a user in a distributed access control system retrieves the remote P3P 
policy, the policy may not necessarily meet the user’s preference. Thus, the user may 
abort the service or continue without the choice for further negotiations. Also P3P 
doesn’t support provider-side requirements; the SP may have some privacy 
constraints that require enforcement at the client’s side.  The main components of a 
P3P privacy statement include the recipient of the data, the purpose for which that 
data is requested, the retention period at the collector’s store, and the data category. It 
can include other components such as disputes and remedies, as well as whether 
disclosure to third parties is allowed. Though P3P covers most of the basic principles 
of privacy [4], the fact that it has not satisfactorily resolved the requirements for 
bilateral privacy negotiation [5] limits its use in access control.  
Shibboleth [6] from Internet2 provides a mechanism for federated access 
management based on the SAML security standard [7]. Shibboleth provide single sign 
on (SSO) and a mechanism for an IdP in one security domain to securely convey 
attributes about a web-browsing user to a SP in another security domain. In 
Shibboleth, privacy is addressed in two ways. Firstly, after the user authenticates to 
the IdP, the Shibboleth authentication service generates a one time handle to identify 
the user and transmits this to the SP. Secondly, the IdP uses Attribute Release Policies 
(ARP's) to decide whether to release specific attributes to the SP or not. This is fine as 
long as the remote site doesn’t require any identifying attributes to complete the 
service. But this is unlikely to be the case in most transaction scenarios. Furthermore, 
the Shibboleth infrastructure doesn’t provide any support for bilateral negotiation of 
service parameters. If the user doesn’t provide the requested attributes, access to the 
services is unilaterally denied.  Another significant privacy flaw is that the ARP is 
coarse and doesn’t support most of the known privacy principles [4]. 
ID-WSF from the Liberty Alliance is an open standard for federated identity 
management that is built upon the extensibility of SAML security assertions [7]. It 
provides a framework for the discovery and communication of identity information 
among federated domains. When a client authenticates to an IdP, a SAML-based 
assertion handle (SSO) is generated and communicated to a relying party or SP with 
optional information which the relying party may use to call-back the user’s IdP. The 
ID-WSF framework provides a flexible security model for a highly distributed set  
of IdPs.  
Microsoft, IBM and VeriSign have been working on a set of specifications (called 
"WS-Security roadmap" or "WS-Identity Policy Framework") for their next 
generation platform of Web services. The WS-Policy suite of policies, which includes 
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Security Policy, Reliable Messaging Policy, etc. are not designed primarily for 
implementing access control. They are predominantly designed to enable Services to 
advertise what requirements (especially authorization requirements) a requesting 
party must satisfy in order to use the services. The idea is that a requesting party can 
consider what it is willing and able to accept, before sending attributes that can satisfy 
the requirements. However, WS-policies do not necessarily provide a means to 
enforce access control policies since typically they are not to be consumed by Policy 
Decision Points (PDPs). 
One approach that addresses bilateral access control is the Automatic Trust 
Negotiation (ATN) technique [8, 9]. ATN introduces a trust negotiation layer for 
symmetrical interactions.  Research efforts in this area have developed advanced 
ATN techniques to cover a variety of scenarios [10] [11] [12]. Recent initiatives in 
preserving privacy [13, 14] also favour the use of negotiation techniques for solving 
privacy problem. ATN is an access control technique that permits the gradual release 
of policies and credentials so that trust can be incrementally increased until the 
communicating parties are sufficiently satisfied of each others trustworthiness to send 
all their confidential information. However, ATN doesn’t provides mechanisms 
whereby the relying party can convey proof of acceptance for obligating constraints - 
assurance that the attributes contained in the assertions will be used in accordance 
with the party’s privacy preferences. Recent work in this area by Spantzel et al [15] 
introduces a framework that integrates ATN with Identity Management Systems 
(IdM). Based on their comparison of ATN and IdM systems, it shows that ATNs have 
not truly explored access security standards such as XACML, SAML, etc which may 
limit their practical implementation.  
To the best of our knowledge, none of the above systems provides a mechanism for 
the remote enforcement of privacy obligations. So there is uncertainty that the 
receiving party will adhere to them. Further, the receiving party may not accept any 
liability if the sender’s PII is compromised. Without privacy assurances there is the 
possibility that the receiving party may even misuse the sender’s PII without any form 
of liability. Privacy negotiation will provide a mechanism that relies less on trusted 
external third parties and more on the communicating parties themselves. Privacy is 
governed by laws, legislation and principles requiring that privacy solutions should 
provide tenable difficult-to-repudiate technical evidence in the case of a privacy 
dispute. Consequently, there is a need to provide a mechanism for providing tamper-
proof technical evidence that may be used in the event of disputes when parties do not 
conform to their commitments. One approach to achieve this is to provide a protocol 
to enable participating parties to exchange digitally signed commitments. We 
acknowledge that a technical “non-repudiable signature” on its own may not be 
sufficient evidence for a court of law since other factors also contribute to a digital 
signature being legally non-repudiable, such as: how much active participation the 
user had in deciding to sign, how free the user is to use the signed-for sensitive 
information, whether the software automatically generated the signature, and how 
complex the signed agreement is. However, these legal issues are not within the scope 
of the current paper. We consider the technical issues only that will help to provide 
difficult-to-repudiate evidence. 
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3   Obligation of Trust (OoT) Protocol 
Obligation of Trust is a protocol that defines a standard mechanism enabling two or 
more communicating parties to exchange obligating constraints as well as proof of 
acceptances. The basic concept is built upon the assumption that a requesting party 
has no means of enforcing obligations placed on a remote party. In traditional access 
control systems, an obligation is an action that should be performed by a Policy 
Enforcement Point (PEP) in conjunction with the enforcement of an access control 
decision [13]. XACML [16] describes an Obligation element as a set of attribute 
assignments, with an attribute FulFillOn which signifies whether the consuming PEP 
must fulfill the obligation if the access control decision is “Permit” or “Deny”. When 
a Policy Decision Point (PDP) evaluates a policy containing obligations, it returns the 
access control decision and set of obligations back to the PEP. However, in a 
distributed environment the SP’s PEP is unlikely to be in the same security domain as 
the service requestor; therefore there is no guarantee that any obligations required by 
the requestor can either be incorporated into the policy used by the SP’s PDP, or even 
if they can, be enforced by the SP’s PEP. Given this, it makes sense to address the 
remote enforcement of obligations by allowing a SP to convey back to the requestor 
an acceptance or rejection of their obligating constraints. The OoT protocol addresses 
this interaction. We divide the OoT protocol into two steps: Notification of Obligation 
(NOB) (which may be signed or unsigned) and Signed Acceptance of Obligation 
(SAO) (which must be signed). The OoT protocol is symmetric. An initiating party 
sends a NOB outlining the obligating constraints it is placing on the other party and 
the commitments it is willing to make if the other party accepts its obligations. The 
other party, after evaluation, sends back either a signed acceptance (SAO) of the 
constraints it accepts and the commitments it requires, or initiates more service 
negotiations with its own NOB, or rejects the request and terminates the session.  
Because the NOB and SAO are constructed using standard XACML obligations 
elements, both communicating parties have a common language for expressing their 
requirements and commitments, and are able to feed these obligations directly into 
their PDPs for automatic decision making, and ultimate enforcement by their 
respective obligations services. 
OoT Encoding Scheme 
The Web Services Profile of XACML (WS-XACML) [17] describes a way for 
carrying XACML policies between communicating parties.  WS-XACML specifies 
formats for four information types:  
• an authorization token or credential for carrying an authorization decision across 
realms,  
• a policy assertion type that is based on XACML elements which can embed WS-
Policy or other XML constructs, 
• ways to wrap P3P policy preferences and match them using XACML assertions, 
and  
• XACML Attributes in SOAP Message Headers in such a way that they can be 
authenticated as having been issued by a trusted authority. 
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The WS-XACML Assertion Type is an abstract framework that describes an 
entity’s Web Service’s policy in the context of different policy domains, such as 
authorization or privacy domains. The name of the Assertion’s element indicates the 
domain to which it applies, such as XCMLPrivacyAssertion for the privacy domain 
and XACMLAuthzAssertion for the authorization domain. The XACMLPrivacy 
Assertion deals with privacy specific Assertions which can carry Requirements i.e. 
what the asserter requires of the other party, and Capabilities i.e. what the asserter is 
willing and able to do for the other party if its Requirements are satisfied. The inner 
box in Figure 1 depicts the WS-XACML model which defines an XACMLAssertion 
AbstractType. This allows constraints on a policy vocabulary to be expressed as 
XACML Apply functions. The XACMLAssertion contains two sets of constraints as 
shown in figure 1.  The first set, called Requirements, describes the information or 
behavior that the policy owner requires from the other party.  The second set, called 
Capabilities, describes the information or behavior that the policy owner is willing 
and able to provide to the other party. One instance of this type is the 
XACMLPrivacyAssertion whose Capabilities element describes the Obligations that 
are being accepted and the information that will be provided.  The Requirements 
element specifies the Obligations that the sender requires of the other party in order to 
proceed. 
 
Fig. 1. SAML Obligation Of Trust Model 
Using the built-in extensibility mechanism of WS-XACML and SAML Assertions, 
we can conveniently encode the components of the OoT protocol as extensions of 
standard elements. The NOB can be expressed as an instance of a XACMLPrivacy 
Assertion in which the desired obligating constraints are placed in the Requirements  
 


















Fig. 2. Example of WS-XACML constraint on P3P PURPOSE 
section of the Assertion, and any obligations that the sender is willing and able to 
fulfill in the Capabilities section. The SAO can be expressed as an instance of a 
XACMLPrivacyAssertion in which the Requirements section specifies the sender’s 
understanding of what the recipient has committed to do and the Capabilities section 
specifies the obligations that the sender has committed to undertake. By signing the 
SOA the signer is stating in a difficult-to-repudiate form their commitment to fulfill 
the Obligations contained in the Capabilities element, so long as their Requirements 
are satisfied. Figure 1 shows the extensions of WS-XACML and SAML that map into 
our Obligation of Trust model. The OoT schema is available at [18], but basically it 
defines a new SAML protocol request type (the Obligation of Trust Query Type) and 
a new SAML statement type (the Obligation of Trust Statement Type).  
In the privacy domain, these elements can be used to describe either the acceptable 
(Requirements) or supported (Capabilities) P3P policy contents. For example, if a 
recipient will only use the sender’s sensitive information for the “current” transaction 
and “admin” purposes, and the information is only for the designated recipient, this 
can be sent as a P3P policy STATEMENT of PURPOSE expressed as a WS-XACML 
constraint as shown in figure 2. 
OoT Protocol Scheme 
Figure 3 is a simplified sketch of the OoT protocol in operation, and shows how two 
parties may exchange signed components of the OoT. Party A wishes to access item 
X from party B, but it is assumed that party A knows nothing about the privacy or 
access control requirements for item X. Similarly, Party B knows nothing about the 
privacy requirements of Party A’s attributes. Party A sends a request for item X and 
Party B responds with a NOB containing its Requirements and Capabilities. Figure 4 
shows an outline of an algorithm for the decision making when a party receives a 
NOB. Party A checks whether it can satisfy Party B’s Requirements, and whether  
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Fig. 3. The OoT Protocol Sketch 
party B’s Capabilities can satisfy its own (party A’s) Requirements. If Party B’s 
Capabilities are acceptable and sufficient for Party A, and A can fully meet B’s 
requirements, then A can send an SAO to B stating its pick of the offered capabilities 
and its own capabilities to meet party B’s requirements. If B’s capabilities are 
acceptable but not sufficient, or A has additional requirements, A may send a counter 
NOB to B containing its additional or alternative Requirements. A’s Requirements 
will determine the subset of B’s Capabilities that it requires, and A may supplement 
them with additional ones of its own. A’s Capabilities will include the subset of B’s 
Requirements that it can provide, along with any additional ones it may be willing to 
provide. If Party B’s Capabilities are insufficient for Party A, then A will either 
terminate the session or return a NOB with Requirements that supercede B’s stated 
Capabilities. If A cannot meet all the stated requirements of B, then A may decide to 
terminate the session or add a reduced set of Capabilities to the NOB.  
Party B evaluates party A’s NOB and if satisfied with A’s Capabilities and 
Requirements it returns a signed SAO stating in its Capabilities that it can fullfil all of 
party A’s Requirements, and in its Requirements which of Party A’s Capabilities it 
has chosen. If B is satisfied with A’s Capabilities but not with A’s Requirements, B 
may either send another NOB to A showing less Capabilities than A requires (along 
with its own Requirements), or terminate the session. If B is not satisfied with the 
Capabilities of A’s NOB, it will either terminate the session or return a NOB with 
increased Requirements. If Party A receives another NOB, and this is satisfactory, it 
returns a signed SAO, otherwise it behaves as last time around. If Party A receives 
party B’s SAO, and if satisfied with it, it returns its own signed SAO. Thus the parties 
continue to exchange NOBs until either one party terminates the session (negotiated 
agreement not possible) or returns a signed SAO. Once a signed SAO has been 
delivered the recipient must either accept this by returning its own signed SAO or  
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• Set flag initially to “SAO” 
• Evaluate received requirements to determine whether I can meet them with my 
capabilities 
o If so, construct offered Capabilities to match received requirements 
o If not, either 
 terminate or 
• determine* whether additional capabilities should be offered to match, 
and/or 
• construct capabilities to match a subset of the received requirements, plus 
additional alternative capabilities to be offered, and set flag to “NOB” 
• Analyse capabilities to be offered by me (as determined above) and construct a 
revised list of (my) requirements. 
• Analyse sets of capabilities received and compare with my list(s) of 
requirements (as determined above). 
o If all my requirements are met from one set of offered capabilities, keep the 
above-defined requirements.  
o If all my requirements are met from merged sets of offered capabilities, 
construct Requirements from these, set flag to “NOB” 
o If my requirements are not met, either 
 terminate or  
 determine* whether requirements can be relaxed due to alternative 
capabilities being offered and modify requirements accordingly and set flag 
to “NOB” 
• If SAO flagged, send SAO, else send NOB. 
(* “determine” could include the possibility to ask a human operator.) 
 
Fig. 4. Outline Algorithm for handling a NOB 
terminate the session. It is not allowed to return a NOB in response to a signed SAO, 
since this is in effect rejecting what one had previously offered in a prior protocol 
exchange. Once the negotiation is complete, and each party is in possession of the 
signed SAO of the other party, then Party A delivers the attribute values defined in 
Requirement B and Party B delivers item X to A. 
As indicated above, in some transactions it will be the case that either a user’s 
configured capabilities are insufficient to match an SP’s requirements, or a user’s 
requirements are too great for an SP’s capabilities. In this case the software might 
indicate to the user that the SP’s (or user’s) requirements are not covered by any of 
the user’s (or SP’s) sets of capabilities. The user should be able to view the NOB 
request and possibly extend their capabilities or reduce their requirements. As an 
example, suppose a user has configured his requirement’s policy so that recipients are 
not to reveal the user's PII to 3rd parties, but a Service X offers very generous 
compensation to Service C's users who are willing to sign up for X’s new services.  In 
this case, Service C could send the user a NOB containing a Requirement to provide 
permission for Service C to release PII to Service X, in exchange for compensation.  
The user’s agent does not have a Capability to match this Requirement, so the user's 
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client software could display Service C’s Requirement for the granting of permission 
to forward the PII to Service X, along with Service C’s Capability to offer 
compensation to the user. If the user dynamically chooses to accept this contract, a 
new Capability is added to the user's set of XACMLPrivacyAssertions, for this and 
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Fig. 5. Matching of Two WS-XACML Assertion Type 
Matching and Evaluation 
Requirements are logically connected by AND: the policy owner requires the other 
party to satisfy all of the constraints listed in the Requirements section.  Capabilities 
on the other hand are logically connected by a non-exclusive OR: the policy owner is 
willing and able to provide any subset of the capabilities described by these 
constraints.  Figure 5 illustrates the matching of the two WS-XACML Assertions. 
Two XACMLAssertions match if, for each assertion, all constraint in the Requirements 
section are satisfied by (at least) one of the statements in the Capabilities section of 
the other assertion. WS-XACML specifies efficient generic algorithms for 
determining that one constraint “satisfies” another. We can use this mechanism to 
evaluate an XACML-P3P policy against an XACML privacy profile (or any policy 
expressed in XML), provided we have matching semantics between them. Once the 
matching is done, the next step is to extract the capability that matches the recipient’s 
requirements, produce the SOA and generate the signatures. 
4   Example of WS-XACML Aware Applications  
The OoT protocol provides a platform which permits two or more communicating 
parties to negotiate obligating constraints in a tamper proof manner. Privacy 
Negotiation is one such good example of using the OoT principles.  
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As an example, an Internet-based ticket service (ITS) provides online ticketing 
services to both consumers and partners through automated Web services. The ITS 
can provide special price offers to certain categories of clients in particular seasons. 
The ITS requires prospective clients to provide or show proof of possession of certain 
properties and then to make firm commitments that they will not disclose its price list 
to third parties (i.e. competitors) before it can decide whether they qualify for special 
offers. On the other hand, the clients may not wish to give out their sensitive attributes 
without receiving proof from the ITS that it will not disclose them. The ITS therefore 
needs to assure the clients that their attributes will be held according to their privacy 





IATA membership certificate 
Certified Quarterly Sales > £12,000.00 
Price List not given to 3rd parties 
Capabilities 
PURPOSE: PII used internally for this transaction 
RETENTION: PII kept only until transaction is completed 
RECIPIENT: PII not given to any 3rd party 
 
Fig. 6. ITS’s Internal XACMLPrivacyAssertion  
XACMLPrivacyAssertion (customer) 
Requirements 
RETENTION: PII kept only until transaction is completed 
RECIPIENT: PII not given to any 3rd party 
   Capabilities 
Name 
IATA membership certificate 
Certificate of Incorporation 
Certified Quarterly Sales > £12,000.00 
Price List not given to 3rd parties 
 
Fig. 7. Customer’s Internal XACMLPrivacyAssertion 
figure 7 is the customer’s internal XACMLPrivacyAssertion. Looking at the 
assertions, the customer’s Requirements are really “Obligations” to be fulfilled by the 
ITS. Similarly, the ITS’s Capabilities are really “Obligations” that the ITS is able and 
willing to meet. The OoT provides the mechanism to assure each participant of the 
other’s commitment to respecting their security preferences.  Each party can save the 
digitally signed XACMLPrivacyAssertion with the complete Capabilities as difficult-
to-repudiate evidence in the case of disputes. 
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5   Conclusion 
This paper describes one concrete approach to enhancing privacy assurance, by 
permitting the bilateral exchange of privacy Requirements and the Capabilities to 
satisfy them. The OoT mechanism merges technical solutions with possible 
social/judicial solutions for security assurance in distributed open systems. This 
mechanism demonstrates a secure way of using P3P policies in WS-XACML which 
provides a framework for the dynamic exchange of requirements and capabilities, 
meaning that this framework can support the P3P platform with minimal effort. Our 
solution demonstrates significant improvement in the provision of privacy in 
distributed transactions where technically “difficult-to-repudiate” services are vital. 
Again, the benefit of this framework is that the same security engine can apply to the 
four types of information described in WS-XACML, meaning that privacy and 
confidentiality can be achieved simultaneously for both service providers and 
consumers. This approach is currently being implemented. 
An additional benefit of this approach over traditional ATN is that it has the 
potential to reduce the number of interactions between parties and therefore the 
effects of network latency since both requirements and capabilities can be transmitted 
in a single payload rather that separately.  A mechanism that assures each party that 
their information will be used in accordance with their wishes will increase the level 
of trust and confidence between the communicating parties and may even reduce the 
liabilities of regulated organizations.  
The OoT protocol has a couple of limitations. Firstly it assumes that the other party 
exists as a physical entity that can be sued if violations occur. This requires either a 
robust PKI system to exist or some other mechanism to establish whether the subject 
of a certificate is a legal entity, and will put meaningful identifying information in the 
issued certificate. Secondly, it is open to probing attacks. A malicious party can probe 
another party by providing bogus capabilities in order to gather the other party’s 
requirements and capabilities and then terminate the connection before any actual data 
is transferred. In [19], we described how XACML can be used to address the probing 
attack by a trust negotiation involving the gradual and incremental exchange of 
information. This requires that the XACML policy is expressed in such a way that the 
level of trust established can determine what other information (policy/attributes) is 
released at any phase. The order and sequence are controlled by the crafting of policy 
rule expressions. Furthermore, we have not dealt with refinements for multiple 
assertions and multiple set of Capabilities. These are the subject of further work. 
Work is currently being carried out on a reference implementation of the proposed 
approach, and the testing and evaluation of this will be published in due course. 
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